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UNISA v REYNHARDT [2010] 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC): DOES AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION HAVE A LIFECYCLE? 
 
M Mushariwa* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Affirmative action seeks to create a working environment based on principles of 
substantive equality,1 the ultimate aim of this pursuit being the creation of a 
workforce representative of the population of South Africa.2 One of the on-going 
debates around affirmative action is whether or not it has a life-span. The one school 
of thought argues that affirmative action requires a legislated sunset clause, in which 
the consideration of issues of race, gender and disability will no longer be required of 
employers.3 Failure to have such a clause is held to give rise to an "institutionalised 
racial spoils system" and to result in reverse discrimination.4 The other school of 
thought argues that the need for affirmative action is two-fold - to redress past 
inequalities but also to deal with existing inequalities within society - and having a 
sunset clause would pervert the aim of affirmative action to deal effectively with both 
kinds of inequalities and also to create a representative workforce.5 
 
The question becomes, is it possible that we can reach a workplace within which 
affirmative action is no longer required? How will we know we have created such a 
workplace?6 The goal of substantive equality within the setting of affirmative action is 
to remove both the visible and invisible barriers to employment equity.7 How will we 
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1
  Mcgregor 2003 SA Merc LJ 421, 435. See also Van der Walt and Kiutri 2006 Obiter 675, 681. 
2
  See the preamble of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
3
  Dupper, Bhoola and Barbers Understanding the Employment Equity Act 131. See also Dupper 
2008 SAJHR 438. 
4
  Dupper, Bhoola and Barbers Understanding the Employment Equity Act 132. 
5
  Dupper, Bhoola and Barbers Understanding the Employment Equity Act 132. 
6
  This question will be answered within the conclusion of this case note. 
7
  Preamble of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
M MUSHARIWA                                                                        PER / PELJ 2012(15)1 
 
413 / 428 
 
know these barriers have been recognised and addressed appropriately? The 
effectiveness and fairness of employment equity is seen in its application and in 
most cases its "reality" is seen in whether or not designated employers meet their 
targets.8 
 
A designated employer9 must apply employment equity in a fair and rational manner 
in order for affirmative action to be seen to bear fruit.10 Affirmative action is there to 
redress the inequalities of the past and must be seen to do so rather than to create a 
form of reverse discrimination.11 In this paper it will firstly be argued that in order for 
an affirmative action policy to be of a standard capable of withstanding constitutional 
scrutiny, it needs to set clear targets of how it will achieve a representative workforce 
within a particular employer setting. Secondly, it is important that once these 
employment equity targets are reached affirmative action should no longer be 
applied within the organisation, in order to ensure that reverse discrimination does 
not occur. It will be argued that once employment equity targets are reached, only 
then will it be justifiable to exercise the principle of employing only the most suitably 
qualified candidate regardless of race, gender or disability. Thirdly, once equity 
targets are reached they must be maintained. If there is a change in composition this 
will require a reapplication of affirmative action, thus creating a distinct lifecycle for 
the application of the principle. Lastly it will be argued that different dynamics are at 
play within each individual designated employer setting. Most evident are the 
dynamics of representivity with a particular focus in most cases on race. In the 
                                            
8
  Vermeulen and Coetzee 2006 SAJBM 53. See also Coetzee and Bezuidenhout 2011 Southern 
African Business Review 75. 
9
  Section 1 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1995 defines a "designated employer" as 
a) an employer who employs 50 or more employees; 
b) an employer who employs fewer than 50 employees, but has a total annual turnover that is equal 
to or above the applicable annual turnover of a small business in terms of Schedule 4 to this Act; 
c) a municipality, as referred to in Chapter 7 of the Constitution; 
d) an organ of state as defined in section 239 of the Constitution, but excluding local spheres of 
government, the National Defence Force, the National Intelligence Agency and the South African 
Secret Service; and 
e) an employer bound by a collective agreement in terms of section 23 or 31 of the Labour 
Relations Act, which appoints it as a designated employer in terms of this Act, to the extent 
provided for in the agreement; 
10
  Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS 2010 5 BLLR 561 (LC) 25.3. 
11
  Dupper 2002 SA Merc LJ 275, 292. 
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landmark decision of UNISA v Reynhardt12 the Labour Appeal Court demonstrated 
that there is a lifecycle in an affirmative action policy which employers must be 
mindful of.  
 
2 The facts of the case 
 
The respondent, Professor Reynhardt, a white male, had been appointed as the 
Dean of the Faculty of Science at the University of South Africa (UNISA) for one 
term. He then applied to serve for a second term. However, Professor Summers, a 
coloured male, was appointed in his place. Professor Reynhardt claimed in the 
Labour Court that his non-appointment amounted to unfair discrimination.13 The 
Labour Court agreed with Professor Reynhardt that although the employment equity 
plan that had been designed by UNISA was in line with the principles and values of 
the Constitution, the manner in which it had been implemented was unfair. The 
UNISA employment equity plan provided that once equitable representation had 
been achieved (UNISA required a ratio of 70% to 30% in favour of blacks) then the 
principle of the "most suitable candidate14" would apply in the filing of vacancies, and 
no further affirmative action would be implemented. 
 
The appointment of Professor Summers meant that the target would be surpassed, 
as the ratio had become 80% to 20%. The Labour Court held that the appointment of 
Professor Summers was therefore a breach of UNISA's employment equity plan and 
that it amounted to unfair race discrimination against Professor Reynhardt. UNISA 
took the case on appeal to the Labour Appeal Court. In arriving at its decision the 
Labour Appeal Court held the following: 
 
                                            
12
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC). 
13
  Reynhardt v University of South Africa 2008 4 BLLR 318 (LC). 
14  In terms s 20(3) of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1995 "a person may be suitably qualified for 
a job as a result of any one of, or any combination of that person's- formal qualification; prior 
learning; relevant experience; or (d) capacity to acquire, within a reasonable time, the ability to 
do the job". 
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Firstly, one of the aims of the Employment Equity Act is to eliminate unfair 
discrimination. Secondly, the court held that the key test in disputes of unfair 
discrimination is found in the case of Harksen v Lane NO,15 where it was held that 
the questions to be asked were: 
1. Does the differentiation amount to discrimination on a specified ground? 
2. If the differentiation amounts to discrimination; does it amount to unfair 
discrimination? 
3. Unfairness is presumed where discrimination is on a specified ground that has 
been identified. 
4. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on 
the complainant and others in his situation.16 
 
Having established a ground of discrimination the court then considered the following 
questions: 
1. Does the measure target personal categories of persons who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination?  
2.  Is the measure designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of 
persons?  
3. Does the measure promote the achievement of equality?17 
 
In the case of Professor Reynhardt, he was held to have proved discrimination on 
the basis of race. The court then needed to evaluate if that discrimination was fair 
within the circumstances of the case. Affirmative action does discriminate. Its 
discrimination is held to be fair due to the aim of affirmative action, which is to 
identify individuals who have been the victims of unfair discrimination, and to seek to 
advance such individuals so as to achieve equality.18 
 
                                            
15
  Harksen v Lane 1997 4 SA 1 (CC). 
16
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1276. 
17
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1279. 
18
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1279. 
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The Labour Appeal Court found that the employment equity plan of UNISA was 
seeking to redress the historical imbalances of the past by deciding upon the targets 
of 70% to 30% in representivity.19 The court further held that within the UNISA 
employment equity plan was an express statement of when employment equity 
would no longer be necessary, which was once the targets had been reached.20 The 
policy was that once the equity target had been reached then the selection of a 
candidate needed to be on the basis of merit, and that in this particular case the 
"most suitable candidate" was Professor Reynhardt. The court held it was on this 
point that UNISA failed to act rationally and fairly in the correct implementation of 
their employment equity plan, and thus failed to show that they had acted to promote 
the achievement of equality. UNISA's appeal to the Labour Appeal Court was 
therefore dismissed.21 
 
3 Analysis of the case 
 
The court in its analysis of the facts of the case was clear on the constitutionally 
justified discrimination that would occur in the application of affirmative action. This 
was necessary, the court thought, to achieve the aim of redressing the imbalances 
within South Africa arising from its apartheid past.22 It is noteworthy that in the 
Reynhardt case the emphasis is on race and the racial composition within each level 
of the posts of Dean and Vice Dean.23 No mention is made of the gender 
composition of the occupants of these posts or of the appointment of persons with 
disabilities within these posts, and of whether or not any targets had been set in that 
regard. The aim of affirmative action is to create a representative workforce with 
respect to race, gender and disability,24 yet there is a clear focus in this case on race 
                                            
19
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1280. 
20
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1280. 
21
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1281. 
22
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1279. 
23
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1276-1277. 
24
  Preamble of Employment Equity Act 55 of 1995. 
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alone.25 Affirmative action is not just about race. The quest for representivity requires 
an investigation into the gender and disability composition of incumbents also. 
 
It is also noteworthy that not only had the employment equity plan of the university to 
be of a standard that would be able to withstand constitutional scrutiny, but it also 
needed to set targets describing how it was to create this representative workforce. 
A clear commitment to transformation may be seen within the University, as the 
targets had been reached.26 
 
The issue in question was the continued application of the employment equity plan 
once those targets had been reached. The employment equity plan clearly stated at 
what stage employment equity would no longer be applied and when individuals 
would be appointed on the basis of merit, irrespective of race. In this case the most 
suitably qualified individual was Professor Reynhardt.27 
 
It has been held that affirmative action remains a means to an end and it is therefore 
justified by its consequences.28 The consequence is the achievement of equality. 
The need for affirmative action will end when past imbalances are rectified.29 The 
issue then becomes how it will be possible to identify the point in time when it will be 
clear that past imbalances have been rectified and affirmative action can thus cease. 
In the case of Willemse v Patelia NO30 the court stated that if an employer has met 
its employment equity targets, the only consideration with regards to appointment or 
promotion should be merit, and each applicant should be treated equally.31 
 
                                            
25
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1276-1277. 
26
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1275. 
27
  UNISA v Reynhardt 2010 12 BLLR 1272 (LAC) 1280. 
28
  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook para 9.5 .See also Mcgregor 2006 Juta's Business 
Law 17. 
29
  Mcgregor 2006 Juta's Business Law 19. 
30
  Willemse v Patelia 2007 28 ILJ 428 (LC). 
31
  Willemse v Patelia 2007 28 ILJ 428 (LC) para 50. 
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In another case, that of Alexandre v Provincial Administration of the Western Cape 
Department of Health,32 the court raised concerns about whether or not the non-
application of affirmative action once targets had been reached in a particular 
department would "advance the spirit and purpose of employment equity and the 
notion of substantive equality as endorsed by our legislative and constitutional 
framework."33 
 
The Reynhardt case gives us an indication of the circumstances when affirmative 
action can cease to the applied, but it is clearly an instance that is specific to a 
particular employer and the wording within that employer's employment equity plan. 
The employer must have a comprehensive employment equity plan that is able to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. Clear targets must be set to increase representivity 
within the workplace. The Reynhardt case also points to the reality that the legacy of 
apartheid and the disparity it created will take time to eradicate through the 
application of affirmative action.34The representivity that resulted in the Reynhardt 
case came about as a result of a clear commitment by the employer to meet 
employment equity targets. 
 
Within the process of applying affirmative action the goal must be not only the 
advancements of individuals previously disadvantaged. Another goal which 
employers must always have in mind is the creation of a workplace where 
substantive equity is a reality and where, over time, appointments will be based on 
merit. This also places a duty on employers to ensure that that once they have 
reached their targets in applying affirmative action they maintain the equitable 
                                            
32
  Alexandre v Provincial Administration of the Western Cape Department of Health 2005 26 ILJ 
765 (LC). 
33
  Alexandre v Provincial Administration of the Western Cape Department of Health 2005 26 ILJ 
765 (LC) para 33. 
34
  The Industrial Conciliation Act 11 of 1924 facilitated the exploitation of domestic workers and 
farm workers, who had no rights or job security. Such jobs were mostly held by blacks. In terms 
of s 77 of the Industrial Conciliation Act 94 1979 the Minister of Labour was able to promulgate 
provisions to safeguard the jobs of Whites and certain Coloured and Indian workers in the 
altruistic guise of safeguarding against racial competition. 
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representation.35 Maintenance would require that should there be a shift in 
representation as against the set targets, then affirmative action would be applied 
again. By implication this would mean that another "lifecycle" of affirmative action 
would begin. 
 
In terms of section 9(2) of the Constitution, 1996, equality includes the full and equal 
enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, 
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories 
of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. The concept of 
equality usually results in individuals being treated the same way or subjecting them 
to similar rules, whereas equity refers to fairness in employment policies by the 
employer, recognising and acknowledging differences, particularly race, gender and 
disability36. Equity in employment comes with the understanding that treating all 
employees in the same way infringes on the goal of substantive equality if the results 
are unequal.37 To achieve equity in the workplace, affirmative action is necessary to 
remedy the consequences of past discriminatory practices which made it impossible 
for members of disadvantaged groups to compete for jobs and opportunities on an 
equal footing.38 
 
The process of achieving equity requires affirmative action, and the outcome of the 
process is to be a workplace based on equity and fairness.39 The Constitutional 
Court in Republic of South Africa v Hugo40 held that with the recognition that society 
affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth, this is not 
achievable as a goal if we insist upon identical treatment in all circumstances before 
that goal is achieved. "Equality requires that equals be treated equally and as a 
corollary that unequals be treated differently."41 Therefore from the point of view of 
                                            
35
  Naff and Dupper 2009 IJCLLIR 186. 
36
  Dupper, Bhoola and Barbers Understanding the Employment Equity Act 131. 
37
  Hepple 2000 CLJ 564. 
38
  Dupper 2002 SA Merc LJ 276. 
39
  Dupper 2002 SA Merc LJ 277. 
40
  Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 4 SA 1 (CC). 
41
  Rosenfeld 1986 CLR 1700. 
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the constitutionally mandated goal it is clear that affirmative action is primarily about 
numbers but also about taking into account the particular circumstances of the 
employer.42 Employers must therefore within their employment equity plans be seen 
both to intend the achievement of substantive equality and to describe how it is to be 
achieved.43 The test is whether or not the measures to be put in place are causally 
linked to the objective of a equitable and representative workforce.44 There is 
recognition that affirmative action is "compensation for past invidious discrimination" 
and thus a "compelling state purpose"; and therefore that "affirmative action does not 
violate the rights of even the innocent person (a non-member of the designated 
group) as their burden is "outweighed by the benefits of affirmative action."45 
 
It has been held that the substantive approach to equality requires a deliberate 
acknowledgement and assessment of historical differences and discrimination in 
order to meaningfully address inequality.46 In terms of section 20(1)(e) of the 
Employment Equity Act47 an indication is given as to the duration of an employment 
equity plan. It may not be shorter than one year or longer than five years. 
Employment equity goals set by an employer are therefore by implication given a 
maximum of five years to be achieved. In the case of Solidarity on behalf of Barnard 
v SA Police Service48 it was held that an employment equity plan needed to be 
applied according to the principle of fairness and the consideration of an employee's 
right to equality and dignity. It has been argued that affirmative action is justified by 
its goal of the achievement of equality. Once equality has been achieved the 
rationale for affirmative action falls away, in which case continued efforts in the 
interest of affirmative action might well be regarded as unfair discrimination.49 
 
                                            
42
  Dupper et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law 259. 
43
  Smith 1995 SAJHR 94. 
44
  Dupper et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law 270. 
45
  Rosenfeld 1985 Ohio St L J 921. 
46
  Gaibie 2011 ILJ 21. 
47
  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
48
  Solidarity obo Barnard v SAPS 2010 5 BLLR 561 (LC). 
49
  Dupper et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law 262. 
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Amercia has applied affirmative action for a much longer period than South Africa. 
Dworkin points out that according to the best evidence yet available affirmative 
action is not counter-productive but seems to be an impressive success in the United 
States.50 It is clear that unless remedied the effects of past discrimination may 
continue for a substantial period of time and even indefinitely.51 Therefore there 
clearly needs to be a rational connection between the affirmative action measures 
employed by a particular employer and the aims which they are designed to achieve, 
one of which is a representative workforce.52 It has been noted that having a 
representative public service is a goal in itself. The Constitution therefore views 
affirmative action not as a limitation of the right to equality but rather as a measure 
necessary to the achievement of equality.53 
 
It has been noted that affirmative action cannot be implemented in isolation of other 
societal and economic issues, and that so as long as disparity continues to exist 
within society along racial lines, be it through a lack of access to education or a lack 
of basic services, such disparity will continue to manifest itself within the employment 
arena.54 Dupper55 points out that the forward-looking rationale of affirmative action is 
that it is a way of overcoming prejudice by changing widely held attitudes towards 
members of disadvantaged groups as well as being a tool for integrating 
disadvantaged groups into a democratic society, thereby breaking down what would 
be an endlessly continuing cycle of poverty, subservience and social inequality. It 
has been held that the duty of the employer within the letter and spirit the EEA is to 
systematically develop its workforce out of a life of disadvantage.56 
 
                                            
50
  Dworkin Sovereign Virtue 408. See also Bowen and Bok Shape of the River. 
51
  National Coalition of Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 1 SA 6 (CC) para 60. 
52
  Grogan Workplace Law 287. 
53
  Dupper 2002 SA Merc LJ 275. 
54
  Mushariwa 2011 Obiter 451. 
55
  Dupper 2004 SALJ 205. 
56
  Director-General, Department of Labour v Win-Cool Industrial Enterprise (Pty) Ltd (2007) 28 ILJ 
1774 (LC) 1798. 
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The American experience of affirmative action is that it is a temporary measure.57 
Employers are called upon to attain racial balance in the workforce but not to 
maintain it through the application of affirmative action.58 Through case law and the 
application of a strict scrutiny policy there has been a slow eradication of the 
application of affirmative action in education as well as in government procurement 
within the United States.59 It is noteworthy that the particularity of the experience of 
affirmative action in the United States is due to its particular social and economic 
context, which is different from that of South Africa.60. Affirmative action in South 
Africa is remedial, whereas in the United States it facilitates free speech, meritocracy 
and the marketplace.61 An implied sunset clause was given in the case of Grutter v 
Bollinger62, a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the affirmative 
action admissions policy of the University of Michigan Law School. The Court 
expected that 25 years from the date of judgment the use of racial preferences would 
no longer be necessary to further the interests approved. The phrase "25 years from 
now" was held to imply a time clause for affirmative action within the United States.63 
 
Within South Africa affirmative action has always been recognised as a temporary 
measure, but the disparities created through the application of apartheid will take 
time to be fully eradicated. Through the Reynhardt case, though, it is clear that within 
the setting of a specific employer affirmative action does have a lifecycle. The factors 
that influence the lifecycle are firstly the wording within the employment equity plan 
of an employer, the employer's commitment to reaching specific targets of 
representation within a predetermined period of time, and lastly the understanding 
that the representivity reached must still be monitored and maintained so that the 
further application of affirmative action does not amount to reverse discrimination. 
Affirmative action remains a means to an end. This should be kept in mind by 
                                            
57
  Naff and Dupper 2009 IJCLLIR 181. 
58
  Naff and Dupper 2009 IJCLLIR 187. 
59
  Richman 2010 De Paul Journal of Social Justice 62. See also Taylor 2010 Pub Cont L J 855. 
60
  Kende Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds 181. 
61
  Kende Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds 181. 
62
  Grutter v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003). 
63
  Schuck 2002 Yale L & Pol'y Rev 284. 
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employers when applying employment equity in order for substantive equality to 
become a reality for all within the labour arena. It is therefore clear that the life span 
of affirmative action is determined by its justification. Once that justification falls away 
it can no longer be fairly implemented. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
In the case of UNISA v Reynhardt it was held that once an employer has reached his 
employment equity targets it is no longer justifiable for the employer to continue to 
apply affirmative action. The employer must therefore in the lifecycle of affirmative 
action apply the principle of the most suitably qualified candidate. Appointments 
must then be based on merit. The non application of affirmative action is subject to 
an employer's commitment to meeting employment equity targets. It is therefore 
possible within a specific employment setting to create a workplace that no longer 
applies affirmative action due to its targets having been reached. It is still important, 
however, that employers realise that they have reached this stage, as a failure to 
recognise this will result in employees or potential candidates who are not 
beneficiaries of affirmative action suffering discrimination that is not justified. Also, 
once employment equity targets are reached it is vital that they be maintained. Once 
a subsequent disparity comes into existence affirmative action must again be 
applied. Ultimately, the goal of affirmative action must be seen as to break down 
both the visible and invisible barriers to achieving equality within the workforce and, 
in doing so, to create an environment where the constitutional values of equality, 
human dignity and freedom are truly recognised and protected. 
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